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The Choice of Form for the Family
Owned Business
By BAuER E. KnAmER* AN ALviN ZiEGLER, JR.**
ONE OF the most interesting problems to challenge the drafting
skills of the business lawyer is that of choice of form and manner of
organization of a substantial, family owned business. Owners with
different ages, life expectancies, financial resources, business expe-
rience, skills, abilities, and personalities must be brought within a
business form that will best balance the legal benefits and detriments,
tax advantages and disadvantages, as well as the estate planning
program of the family The process will often result in the selection of
a form less than ideal, but the best working compromise with desired
results.
This article deals with some of the problems that arise in choice
of form and organization. To serve as a basis for discussion, we as-
sume a family-the Smiths-of husband, wife and three adult children.
Perhaps the relationships and problems of our Smith family have not
all occurred at one tune in selection of form for a family business, but
all of them occur frequently in this context, and in that sense the
Smith family presents a typical case. It is hoped that the problems
and discussion presented will have a relevance broader than the as-
sumed factual basis.
The ability to select a form of doing business winch will yield rea-
sonably predictable results is one of the most important skills in
planning for the family business of whatever size. It is usually more
important to provide a solution which can be virtually certain to avoid
litigable risk than to provide a form of organization which, if success-
ful, might bring substantial tax savings. The penalty for uncertainty in
the family business is often litigation which the owners of the business
cannot afford; in the tax area, for instance, it would be an unusual
family business which would be willing to incur the costs of a Tax
Court and appellate contest unless a favorable outcome was virtually
certain.
The adversary, arm's length relationships which are present among
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Education Program (1954); member, Califorma Bar.0 * LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1960; member, Califorma Bar.
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the owners, management, and creditors of a publicly held business
are not present in the family business. Similarly, the day to day
checks and balances which arise from the contact of persons with
competing interests are absent. In some respects the more casual
atmosphere of the family business may decrease the urgency of precise
organizational planning. But the absence of recurring arm's length
relationships and contacts also works to complicate the problem of
effective planning. Most of the rules of practice in business law, and
particularly corporation rules, have been established with the prob-
lems of the large, publicly held company in mind. Many of these rules
are not easily adaptable to the family business context where one or
more persons will usually have the roles of manager, stockholder, and
creditor simultaneously.
The informality of the family business may erode any carefully
tailored organizational plan; planning should take into account this
risk. If the parties do not act their parts, there may come a time when
the status, or purported role, of the owner, manager, or creditor of the
business will be subject to attack by the Internal Revenue Service,
outside creditor, or other interested party Short of such attack,
dangerous uncertainties may arise which can be clearly determined
only by litigation, a course which the family business planner usually
abhors. This article assumes that the job of a lawyer who is advising
the organization of a family business is to chart plans which at best
will m imize or avoid the dangers of such uncertainties, and which
at worst will provide predictable avenues for dealing with trouble-
some uncertainties as they arise.
Assumed Facts
Smith, a man in his late fifties, is sole proprietor of a small business
known as Smith Electric Company, engaged in the sale of electrical
control devices. Smith manufactures a control of his own design and
sells catalog items produced by major manufacturers. The business
assets consist of the offices and plant, well located in the industrial
section of the city, machinery and equipment, and a substantial
inventory, all current. With but minor exceptions, all depreciable
property has been completely depreciated.
The business has been successful in the past, but due to competi-
tive conditions is less so now, and each year the sale of the Smith-
manufactured items represents a smaller percentage of the total
sales volume. Except for the last few years, when earnings were poor,
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Smith always drew and spent less than the business net income, with
the result that the business net worth has increased through the years.
Smith Electric Company has no outstanding debt. The net worth of
the business represents about three quarters of Smith's total net worth;
his personal assets are his home, life insurance, bank accounts, and
stocks and bonds.
Smith has two sons, both married, who are employed in the busi-
ness. Son John is a graduate engmeer-able--with ideas for expansion
of the company's products into a new but related field. John has
invented and patented a small but sophisticated electric control device
for "space-age" components. Son Richard is a salesman-also able -a
happy extrovert with little interest in the managerial or engineering
aspects. Smith also has a daughter, Karen, who is married to a school
teacher and lives in Idaho. Smith's first wife died in 1946, leaving her
estate to her husband. In 1950 Smith married his present wife Mary
who is younger than he. There are no children of the second marriage.
Relations between Smith and his wife are good, but he is disturbed
by the fact that Mary and his three children do not get along well.
Smith recognizes the need to provide ownership interests for his
two sons if they are to remain with the business. John has already had
offers from an electronics firm at considerably more than he is now
earning, plus the incentive of stock options, group life insurance, and
a profit-sharing plan. Richard could easily earn twice what Smith is
paying hun as a salesman for any of Smith's eastern suppliers or larger
local competitors. Smith recognizes the need for expansion if the
business is to survive, although he is worried about the risk inherent
in what John proposes and is hesitant to incur a substantial debt to
retool the plant and hire additional skilled technicians to manufacture
the new device.
Smith's friends have told him that a corporation affords complete
insulation from personal liability, that there are substantial tax savings
and fringe benefits inherent in the corporate form, and that he can
minimize the double tax on corporate income paid out in dividends by
taking a large part of his contribution in debt instruments rather than
entirely in stock. They have also told him that stock affords a con-
vement instrument of periodic sales or gifts of interests to the sons
and that preferred stock is a convenient method of assuring an income
to his wife, who in all probability will survive him, and to his daughter
Karen, for whom he also wishes to make provision. Smith is strongly
oriented toward the corporate form at the tme of the first appoint-
ment with his attorney.
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How Much of Smith's Property Is and Will
Become Community.?
One of the first areas of uncertainty which will be encountered on
the assumed facts is that arising from the confusing application of com-
munity property rules to a business which begins as separate property,
but which probably will owe any future appreciation in large part to
personal services. The question of allocation between community and
separate property of a family business would appear to be primarily
an estate planning problem. The problem actually is more basic. The
question of how much of the business is community is really a ques-
tion of who owns what, and will be important in virtually every phase
of planning for the Smith business. For instance, Smith intends to
provide each member of his family an interest in the business; it is
assumed that this plan will reqire that Smith make gifts to Karen
if not to other members of the family In order to plan (a) the amount
and nature of gifts to be made to Karen, (b) Smith's ability to make
gifts of the business without Mary's consent, and (c) the dimensions
of any risk of loss of control by Smith after completion of the gifts,
it will be necessary to know what part of the business is community
now, and what part of the business may become community in the
future.
In making a decision concerning the character of the business for
the future, Smith's advisers will meet the confusing and dangerously
unpredictable principles which have been set down in this area by
the California courts. If one form of business entity would work to
minimize the problems in this area, this would be a factor favoring
use of that form.
The basic principles of California community property law are well
established, but their application to Smith's assets is difficult. No
cautious attorney would venture to advise Smith exactly how much
of his estate is community now or how much may become community
in the future. All property owned by a spouse at the time of marriage
is the separate property of such spouse; all property purchased or
otherwise obtained by a spouse in exchange for separate property
becomes separate property; all of the rents, issues, and profits of
separate property are separate property.'
The trouble begins when the language of the statute regarding
"rents, issues and profits" is applied to a business to which the husband
contributes services as well as capital. In most cases it is clear from
I CAL. CIV. CODE § 163.
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the business standpoint as well as from the standpoint of community
property law that any appreciation in such a business is in some part
attributable to the husband's services. It is usually clear, too, that part
of the appreciation of a business is attributable, or at least analogous
to, a return on the capital invested m the business. In most family
businesses the husband is withdrawing some part of the profits as a
reward for his services periodically as the services are performed. In
the family business, unlike the publicly held business in which salaries
are reviewed by theoretically independent authority, the amount of
property which is drawn by the husband as a "salary" or other periodic
reward for his services cannot be accepted by the courts as a binding
or even strongly probative measure of the value of the husband's
services.
Two possible formulae for solving the allocation problem in Cali-
fornia have been employed by the courts where the husband's personal
services since marriage have enhanced the value of his separate prop-
erty. The formulae were originally propounded in Pereira v. Pereira'
and Huber v. Huber$ and will hereinafter be called the Pereira ap-
proach and the Huber approach respectively.
These two methods have been well summarized in Tassi v. Tassi:4
Two approaches have ordinarily been made to the allocation of
earnings in such cases: 1. to allow interest on the capital investment
of the business, allocate such interest as separate property, and treat
the balance as community earnings attributable to the efforts of the
husband (Pereira v. Pereira . . ); 2. to determine the reasonable
value of the husband's services in the business, allocate that amount
as community property, and treat the balance as separate property
attributable to the normal earnings of the business. (Huber v.
Huber . )5
Both methods are probaby still acceptable under the authorities,
although one has definitely been favored over the other.
In Estate of Neilson v. Neilson,6 the leading case on allocation of
appreciation of a separate property business, the Pereira approach is
described as the "usual method of apportionment."7 The supreme court
in Neilson, however, failed to indicate whether in circumstances
2 156 Cal. 1, 103 Fac. 488 (1909).
827 Cal. 2d 784, 167 P.2d 708 (1946).
4 160 Cal. App. 2d 680, 325 P.2d 872 (1958).
5 Id. at 690, 325 P.2d at 878. Tasst followed the second approach pointing out
that the business was of a type justifying high return on capital.
657 Cal. 2d 733, 371 P.2d 745 (1962).
7Id. at 740, 371 P.2d at 748.
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justifying a departure from the "usual method" the departure should
be made by adopting a completely different method, the Huber ap-
proach for instance, or by raising the rate of interest to be applied to
separate property as a special application of the "usual method." Most
of the uncertainties then, which existed prior to Neilson in allocating
appreciation of the husband-run business have survived that case.
There is no indication that the appellate courts have ever con-
sidered the adjustments required under either formula to allow for
the effect of income taxes or compounding interest. When the court
in Neilson says that "the usual rate for a well-secured investment" 8
should be applied, it is by definition referring to a rate before taxes. To
apply even a six per cent rate without adjustment for tax impact under
the Neilson approach could have the effect of allocating the entire
increment unjustly to separate property. Conversely, the Huber ap-
proach, usually considered favorable to separate property, could tilt
the scales in favor of community unless appropriate tax adjustment
is made. Some illustrations will show how this can operate:
(1) Assume that husband owns an interest in a closely held cor-
poration in which he is an executive employee and that its profits
before taxes equal twelve per cent on invested capital as it existed at
date of marriage. Assume that the combined state and federal taxes on
the corporation's income approximate fifty per cent. Assume that hus-
band's stock had a book value of 200,000 dollars at -the time of his
marriage and 400,000 dollars at the time of his death twenty years
later, and that book value is accepted by all concerned as market value.
Under these facts, if six per cent is the proper rate "for a well secured
investment," the application of a six per cent rate to 200,000 dollars
(original capital) for the period of marriage will result in the entire
increment being allocated to separate, whereas only half should be
separate, since both community and separate were reduced by fifty
per cent in corporate income taxes. If the business were of a type justi-
fying the Huber approach, and if it could be shown that the husband's
salary was 12,000 dollars a year less than what comparable executives
receive in comparable employment, the effect would be to allocate the
entire increment to community, whereas again it should properly be al-
located half to each, with the determination being that 300,000 dollars
of his business interest is the husband's separate property and 100,000
dollars is his community property.
(2) Assume the same facts as in the first illustration except that
81d. at 740, 371 P.2d at 748-49.
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the business is a sole proprietorship, that the husband is m a combined
state and federal tax bracket of fifty per cent, and that he pays his
taxes from his business drawing account. Here an even more unjust
result would follow, for if the drawing account is treated as his com-
munity earnings no part of the increment would be allocated to com-
munity under either formula if the husband's income taxes exceeded
12,000 dollars per year.
Another interesting problem left unanswered by the Neilson ap-
proach is the question of whether the assumed rate of interest is
simple interest or compound interest. Stated differently, is it an interest
rate computed on the value of the separate property at date of mar-
riage multiplied by the number of years of marriage, or does it recog-
nize that earnings may have been ploughed back and that a return on
invested capital requires inclusion of the annual increment?
It seems unreasonable to make no allowance for additions to capital
resulting from increase in earned surplus (or net worth, if an unin-
corporated business). In the first illustration above, at the end of the
first fiscal year following the marriage, the husband's stock would have
a book value of 224,000 dollars of which 212,000 dollars would repre-
sent his separate property (at a six per cent rate) and 12,000 dollars
would represent community. By leaving the profits in the business, he
has enabled it to become more productive, and if he is entitled to the
rate of interest on a "well secured investment" for the second year,
it is a return on 212,000 dollars, not on 200,000 dollars. How these
matters would be treated if made an issue in an appropriate case on
appeal cannot be predicted. Perhaps the real meaning of the Neilson
decision is that allocation is a hopelessly complex subject where preci-
sion of computation must give way to the desirability of a simple
formula.
One possible method for avoiding the problem of uncertainty in
allocation between community and separate property in such a hus-
band-run family business is present on the facts of the Smith case. The
argument for allocating some part of appreciation of the business to
community usually involves the principle that the husband is leaving
part of the appreciation attributable to his services in a business which
he actually owns. It is difficult to imagine a case in which appreciation
of value of a business owned by someone other than the husband for
which he acted as chief executive could be attributed to the com-
munity property of husband and wife on a theory that the husband
actually had gained an interest in that business enforcible against the
owners by leaving earnings in the business. On the facts assumed
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above, it could be argued that if upon incorporation of the Smith
business all of the common stock of the enterprise was allocated to
Richard and John, with Smith retaining control if desired through
ownership of voting preferred stock, no part of appreciation in the
common stock (even if it could be shown to be attributable to Smith's
services) should be allocated to community property. There are no
cases which would tend to prove or disprove this theory, but it does
have a certain logical appeal. Its weakness lies in the fact that Smith
and his sons are not dealing at arm's length and that Mary might sub-
sequently contend that to the extent any allocation of appreciation to
community property would otherwise have been made, Smith has
been making periodic gifts to John and Richard.
By a careful tailoring of interests in a corporation, some deter-
rents to a claim by a wife of a community interest in an originally
separate property husband-run business are available. If there is any
chance of marital dispute between Smith and Mary, this factor would
tend to favor use of the corporate form. The convenience for other
purposes of allocating only a nominal value to the common stock in
the enterprise increases the significance of the suggested argument
here.
Considerations on Formation of a Corporation
The Corporate Form as a Shelter
from Personal Liability
One of the least valid reasons for choosing the corporate form is
to avoid personal liability. In the first place, since the Smith entity
would under some of the orgamzational plans recommended not in-
clude all assets of the present proprietorship (the real property being
omitted) 9 it is doubtful whether any lending institution would loan
money to the corporation without the co-signature of Smith on the
note. Another practical consideration that militates against the sup-
posed advantage of sole corporate responsibility for debts is the per-
sonal and emotional response of a man like Smith whose productive
years have been identified with the birth and growth of Smith Electric
Company He is usually unable to view its financial difficulties objec-
tively and will usually pledge his personal credit when the business
is in difficulties.
There is a further element of risk that weakens the protection
afforded by the corporate entity. Men m Smith's position frequently
9 See text accompanying note 121 infra.
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fail to notify suppliers and creditors of the new corporate form and
fail to secure from them an agreement to look solely to the corporation
to satisfy claims. To Smith it is his business regardless of form. He
places orders to be filled after incorporation and fails to obtain express
corporate ratification. He fails to notify suppliers that henceforth
they will be dealing with a corporation, for he senses than any indica-
tion that he is no longer personally liable casts doubts on the solvency,
continuity, and standing of the enterprise. Thus, the first thing that
Smith is apt to do is recur promoter's liability or mislead creditors so
that the law would permit them to disregard the corporate entity.
On the subject of promoter's liability, the case of Shell Oil Co. v.
Hanchett0 is a warning of what can happen to Smith. There, defendant
Hanchett entered into a contract to purchase gasoline from Shell Oil
Company for the benefit of a taxi corporation he was about to form.
Delivery of gas was first made to Hanchett, and he was billed, but
after formation of the corporation, it was billed. The corporation be-
came bankrupt. Suit was brought by Shell Oil against Hanchett and
he was held personally liable. The court said.
The rule seems to be well settled that a promoter, though he
may assume to act on behalf of a projected corporation and not for
himself, cannot be treated as an agent of the corporation, for it is
not yet in existence; and he would be personally liable on his con-
tract unless there was an agreement to look to the new company,
when formed, for payment."
Aside from the immediate risks of promoter's liability which will
normally decrease and ultimately disappear as contracts made before
incorporation are performed by the corporation, what degree of pro-
tection does the corporate entity afford in the future? What is the state
of the law as to "alter ego," "disregard of the corporate entity" or
"piercing the corporate veil"?
It is interesting to re-examine the doctrine set forth forty years ago
in the leading case of Minifie v. Rowley12 to see 'how far the disregard
has extended. Then it was said.
Before the acts and obligations of a corporation can be legally
recognized as those of a particular person, and vice versa, the fol-
lowing combination of circumstances must be made to appear: First,
that the corporation is not only influenced and governed by that
person, but that there is such a unity of interest and ownership that
1o 18 Cal. App. 2d 240, 63 P.2d 338 (1936).
31 Id. at 243, 63 P.2d at 339.
12187 Cal. 481, 202 Pac. 673 (1921).
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the individuality, or separateness, of the said person and corpora-
tion has ceased; second, that the facts are such that an adherence to
the fiction of the separate existence of the corporation would, under
the particular circumstances, sanction a fraud or promote injustice.13
The first requirement of Minifie v. Rowley has been weakened by
later cases, and the second element allows the trial court to apply a
wide range of discretion in determining whether injustice will be done
if the corporate entity is respected. "The conditions under which the
corporate entity may be disregarded.., necessarily vary according to
the circumstances in each case ...within the province of the trial
court."14 One share of stock alone now satisfies the "unity of interest
and ownership" concept that was thought essential in Minifie."5
Besides ownership of shares, other factors considered under the
"unity' concept include commingling of personal and corporate funds,
treatment of assets by an individual as his own, holding out by a per-
son that he is liable for corporate debts, failure to maintain minutes
or records, confusion of records of the individual and corporation,
identical ownership of two or more entities, use of the same office or
files, use of the corporation as a conduit for a single venture, dis-
regard of arm's length relationships, use of the corporation to procure
labor for another entity, diversion of assets from corporation to stock-
holder, use of the corporate form to transfer to it the liabilities of
another entity, and undercapitalization of the corporation.1 6 Many of
these causes for disregarding the corporate entity are the kind of mis-
takes that Smith will be prone to make, by continuing pre-mcorpora-
tion practices.
The adoption of the concept of "undercapitalization" as a ground
for disregard of the corporate entity is confusing analytically and leaves
the business lawyer unable to predict the outcome of an attack on the
corporate citadel when thin incorporations of small family ventures are
involved. Writers have been understandably puzzled in attempts to
fit the undercapitalization concept into the alter ego doctrine. One
suggests that "undercapitalization" is in reality a "corollary principle"
to the ordinary alter ego rules.iT
a Id. at 487, 202 Pac. at 676. (Emphasis added.)
14 Stark v. Coker, 20 Cal. 2d 839, 846, 129 P.2d 390, 394 (1942) (stockholders
held personally liable on corporate note).
35 Riddle v. Leuschner, 51 Cal. 2d 574, 335 P.2d 107 (1959).
16 Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., 210 Cal. App. 2d 825, 838-40,
26 Cal. Rptr. 806, 813-15 (1962).
17Schifferman, The Alter Ego Doctrine in California, in Anvisinc CALwomu
Busnm~ss ENTEmisE. 785, 796 (California Practice Handbook No. 9, Continuing Edu-
cation of the Bar, Stumpf ed. 1958).
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How can a businessman know in advance what capitalization will
be regarded as adequate by a court viewing the matter in retrospect
after some unexpected financial disaster has occurred? As was pointed
out m a dissenting opinion in Automotriz Del Golfo De Californuz S.A.
de C.V. v. Resnck,'
In fact it may be said that every corporation which fails because
it is unable to pay its obligations is underfinanced, but certainly
that should not be a test of whether the entity should be disregarded.
In a rapidly changing economy what might seem to be adequate
financing today would be inadequate tomorrow, and it should be
obvious that risky business ventures could not be undertaken by use
of the corporate device without subjecting the participants to per-
sonal liability.i9
In Automotriz the majority held that where the monthly volume
of business of an auto sales corporation ran between 100,000 and
150,000 dollars, evidence of no capital paid in, or at most 5,000 dollars
capital, was sufficient to support a finding that the business was under-
capitalized. As a result, the plaintiff, a seller of autos to the defendant,
was able to recover from the individuals who organized and loaned
money to the company.
The extension of the undercapitalization principle to new fields is
well illustrated by Minton v. Cavaney,20 where the estate of an at-
torney who had acted as an accommodation incorporator with one
share of stock was held liable for a tort judgment against the bankrupt
corporation. There a corporation was organized to operate a swimming
pool. The corporation had no assets except a lease on the pool premises
which was later cancelled for failure to pay rent. Plaintiff's daughter
drowned in the pool, a wrongful death action was brought against the
corporation, and judgment was obtained. When the judgment was
not satisfied, an action was brought against the accommodation in-
corporator-stockholder, and upon his death his personal representative
was substituted as defendant. Judgment for plaintiff was reversed on
a question of proof, but the concept of individual, liability was ap-
proved.
Minton is apparently the first case in California to extend the under-
capitalization doctrine to tort cases.2 1 The principle of disregarding the
corporate entity has come a long way from the original concept of
1847 Cal. 2d 792, 306 P.2d 1 (1957).
1Old. at 800, 306 P.2d at 6 (dissenting opinion).
20 56 Cal. 2d 576, 364 P.2d 473 (1961).
21 Compare Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), wlch is also a
tort case but wluch is much more closely related to the traditional reasons for disre-
garding the entity.
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preventing the use of a corporation to perpetrate a fraud on creditors.
The doctrine of Minton may well be applicable to the Smith situa-
tion. He will probably lease the very valuable real property to the
business, and if the acquisition of new equipment is to be financed,
the value of the business other than inventory will be offset by debts.
Under the expanding concept of implied warranty, the malfunction-
ing of an electric control in a space package could involve the com-
pany in liability running into many millions, or a tort clami for injury
or death of operators. Who can say how much capitalization will
insulate Smith from personal liability in the face of the Minton deci-
sion? The corporate form could be a trap leading to ruin if he were
to place any reliance on the shelter of the corporation. As a partner
in a partnership, he is at least aware of the extent of his personal risk
and therefore on notice to obtain adequate insurance. While it is true
that insurance compames will often add the owners of a closely held
corporation as named insureds without extra premium, this is by
custom limited to those holding more than twenty per cent of the
stock. Thus John and Richard might not enjoy personal insurance
protection during the early years, and conversely Smith might not
have a sufficient interest in the corporation to qualify after he has
transfered most of his interests to his children as he approaches retire-
ment. Neither would be a desirable result.
In choosing the business form, Smith must consider prospects of
business failure as well as success, because the business is small and
the new process to be contributed by John is untested.22 The prob-
lems of organization are complicated by the fact that family members
with a diversity of investment motives will have interests in the busi-
ness. Interests will be allocated to members who will participate in
management as well as to those who will not. Smith desires to provide
interests for his daughter which will carry some senior claim to earn-
ings and liquidation proceeds. He intends salaries to be paid to his
sons, and he intends to provide them ownership interests, the value
of which will depend on the future success of the business. He feels
that his sons should benefit primarily from future earnings of the
business, and that he and his wife, and to a lesser extent his daughter,
should have the benefits of the present value of the business.
Richard has nothing to contribute to the business other than -his
services. Karen's husband has a modest income and no prospects
of significant earnings improvement. Smith himself wants to protect a
2 2 In certain aspects of organization, estate planning considerations cannot be
ignored, but we are not attempting to do any more than indicate their general relation-
ship to the choice of form.
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substantial part of the capital which he has built up in the business
from the risks of the new business. Smith desires to retain control of
the new business entity, at least during the remainder of his active
years with Smith Electric Company
The Undesirability of a Single
Class of Common Stock
At the outset it should be made clear to Smith that he cannot
accomplish the allocation of managerial and ownership interests which
he 'has in mind using only a single class of stock. Smith, Mary, and
Karen cannot receive a senior claim on earnings through common
stock. Smith can be assured of a preferred claim on the earnings and
other resources of the business through his salary, but no similar
preferred claim can be made available to Mary or Karen if there is
only one class of stock. John and Richard, like Smith, will have a senior
claim on earnings and resources of the enterprise by reason of their
claimed right to salary as consideration for their services. Assuming
that Smith, Richard, and John would be drawing a salary, the use
of common stock would offer an anomaloris allocation of participating
interests in the business. Karen and, after Smith's death, Mary, the
family members who most need a relatively secure income, would
have the least assurance of receiving any steady income. Richard and
John, who should be most willing to sacrifice the security of steady in-
come in favor of future capital appreciation, would have the greatest
assurance of a steady income.
Other disadvantages would flow from the use of a single class of
common stock upon incorporation of the Smith business, an enterprise
in which some members have no contribution at the time of mcorpora-
tion other than their promise to provide future services.23 Stock may
be issued as paid-up only in consideration for past services or for
property in California2 4 and most other states.2 5 Richard, who can
23 This is particularly true if it be assumed that gifts cannot or will not be made
among the organizers of the business. It has been assumed for the purposes of this
article that Smith, although willing to make a substantial gift to Karen upon incorpora-
tion, would not desire to make a similar gift to John or Richard.
24"No shares of stock, with or without par value, shall be issued except in con-
sideration of any or all of the following:
"(c) Services actually rendered.
"If authorized in its articles or by-laws, a corporation may issue the whole or any
part of its shares ... prior to full payment under such restrictions as are imposed by
this division." CAL. CoRP. CoDE § 1109.25 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 152 (1953); N.Y. STocx Corn,. LAw § 69;
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contribute nothing but a promise of future services, will be able to
acquire paid-up stock of significant value only through gift, loan, or
prepayment for his services. It would seem clear, on the other hand,
that John may properly receive stock in exchange for his patent, as
"intangible property."26 To the extent that stock was issued to John
as consideration for "know-how" associated with the patent or for
a promise to help develop the patent, the prohibition against issuance
of paid-up stock for consideration other than property might apply.27
The prohibition against issuing stock for a promise of future ser-
vices could be avoided by issuing stock to Richard either in the form of
partly paid shares with payment provided by future services2" or at
a price cheaper than that paid by other participants in the business.
The latter alternative would result in a gift or a payment for future
services, however, and the former would not provide Richard a posi-
tion of real equality with holders of paid-up stock. It will often not
be desirable or feasible for any of the other participants in a business
to make a loan or gift to the contributor of services. In many cases,
too, it will be impractical for the company or any of the participants
therein to pre-pay the contributor of services for his future work.
Any attempt to provide shares to the services man at a price cheaper
than that paid by other stockholders not only would result in a gift,
but also would probably cause Richard to be taxed on the bargain
increment as compensation income.29 Issuance of shares to Richard
as partly paid, moreover, would present problems of potential liability
to creditors in the exent of business failure. ° If the initial require-
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-603 (1958). But cf. Petnshen v. Westmoreland Fin.
Corp., 394 Pa. 552, 147 A.2d 392 (1959). See generally Herwitz, Allocation of Stock
Between Servwes and Capital in the Organization of a Close Corporation, 75 HAnv.
L. REv. 1098, 1101-11 (1962).
26 See CAL. CoRnp. CODE § 1109(e).
27 Compare Rev. Rul. 64-56, 1964-1 Cum. BULL. 133, in which "know how" is
defined and under prescribed limits treated as "property" for tax purposes.
28"[It is possible to apply for a permit to issue stock to an employee although
only partly paid for by cash and/or service already rendered, with a balance due in
services to be rendered." 1 BAL.IENTm & STERLInG, CAJ.WoRNr& CoRoOATION LAws
§ 101, at'214 (4th ed. 1964) (quoting Donald A. Pearce, co-author of the edition).29 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(2) (1957), as amended, T.D. 6272, 1959-2 Cum.
BuLL. 126, T.D. 6696, 1963-2 Cum. BULL. 23; George S. Carter, 36 T.C. 128 (1961);
cf. United States v. Frazell, 213 F Supp. 457 (W.D. La. 1963), rehearing denied,
CCH 1965-1 STAND. FED. TAx. REP. f[ 9125 (5th Cir. 1964); Stuart L. Baltimore, 17
CCH Tax Ct. Mein. 388, 390 (1958).
30 CAL. Cor. CODE § 1300 provides that all shareholders are liable to the cor-
poration for the "full consideration agreed to be paid for the shares." If a stockholder
promises to provide consideration in the form of services, it would probably be held
that upon insolvency of the corporation he is liable to creditors for the cash value
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ments of the corporatofi for tangible property are fixed, the executory
obligation of Richard for payment of the remaining obligations on
the partly paid shares may increase the aggregate risk of the Smith
family."'
One method to at least postpone the recognition of income upon
issuance of stock to Richard at a bargain price would be to subject his
stock to restrictions on transferability which would have a "significant
effect effect on value,"32 and which would prevent his interest in the
shares from having a, readily ascertainable fair market value.3 3 The
use of such restrictions would not, however, ameliorate the other prob-
lems. To the extent that shares are issued in consideration for services,
the availability of section 1244 will be lost, and if stock (presumably
that issued for services) is subject to restrictions which make it a "sep-
arate class" the availability of subchapter S will be lost.34
Various other schemes can be employed to enable Richard to
purchase stock, which for the most part raise their own problems
similar to those recited above. For instance, Richard could provide his
promissory note to the corporation for shares upon incorporation, a
bonus could be provided Richard shortly after incorporation, and Rich-
ard could use the bonus to purchase his shares. This scheme would
cause Richard to be taxed immediately on the bonus, and the dram
on the corporation's liquid assets represented by the bonus might be
undesirable.
Even if the problem of the corporation law prohibition against
issuance of stock for promise of services and the danger of compensa-
ton-income could be overcome, other serious problems would arise
if stock was actually provided to Richard or John for a promise of
future services. If Richard received more than twenty per cent of the
of his promised services. Cf. CA CoRnP. CoDE § 1306. See generally 1 BA=TnqE
& STERLqNG, op. cit. supra note 28, §§ 244-58.
B'It is also clear that the bar of CAL. Corn'. CODE § 1109, and similar statutes,
cannot be avoided by use of no-par stock. See generally Herwitz, supra note 25, at
1106-07.32 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(5) (1957), as amended, T.D. 6272, 1959-2 Cum.
BuLL. 126, T.D. 6696, 1963-2 Cum. BuLL. 23. But see Herwitz, supra note 25, at
1116-17, in which the author argues very convincingly that ms the closed corporation
the effect on value of restrictions on transferability may not be significant enough.
S3 Harold H. Kuchman, 18 T.C. 154 (1952); Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(c)(2) (1959),
as amended, T.D. 6481, 1960-2 Cum. BuLL. 159, T.D. 6540, 1961-1 Cum. BuLL. 161,
T.D. 6696, 1963-2 Cum. BuLL. 23; cf. Robert Lehman, 17 T.C. 652 (1951), nonacqui-
escence, 1952-1 Cum. BuLL. 5.
34 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1244(c)(1)(D), 1371(a)(4), see text following
note 37 infra.
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voting stock of the new corporation solely for services, rather than for
"property," the incorporation-transfer of the old business to the new
corporation would be disqualified for section 351 treatment and tax-
able gain or loss would be required to be recogized upon the trans-
fer and incorporation. This result would follow because the non-
recognition provisions of section 351 apply only in the event that
transferors of property are in eighty per cent control of the corporation
immediately after the transfer, and because absent qualification under
section 351 recognition is required under section 1002.
Stock issued for John's patent would be considered given for prop-
erty 85 Also, John could receive stock in exchange for secret processes
associated with the patent and for services which are merely ancillary
and subsidiary to the "property" transferred.3 6 If the services provided
are more than ancillary or subsidiary to the patent or process, or if
the services relate peculiarly to Smith's business, then they will not
be considered as "property."37
Additional problems could flow from the issuance of stock for
services, or from the issuance of stock to the contributors of services
at a bargain price. One of the advantages of use of common stock in
a small business is the possible qualification of that stock for section
1244 treatment. Internal Revenue Code section 1244 enables the
original holders of stock qualifying under that section to enjoy ordi-
nary losses in the event of a sale at a loss, or worthlessness, of his
shares, and to enjoy capital gain treatment on sale of shares at a
profit. These provisions make the use of common stock very desirable
in planning with the possibility of business failure in mind if qualifica-
tion for Section 1244 treatment can be assured.
Certainly the organizers of any small business should insure that
any common stock created upon incorporation does qualify under
section 1244; qualification under that section is easily achieved in
most cases. It will be assumed that common stock used in the business
will be qualified to the extent possible.38
Section 1244 treatment will be lost, however, to the extent that
shares are issued for "services" rather than "property" A prerequsite
for qualification is that the stock be issued for property other than stock
3 5 See Treas. Beg. § 1.351-1(a)(2) Example (1) (1955).
38 See Rev. Rul. 64-56, 1964-1 Cum. BuLL. 133; cf. Harold L. Regenstein, 35
T.C. 183 (1960).
37 Rev. Rul. 64-56, 1964-1 Cum. Bu_ . 133.
38 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1244, applies only to common stock.
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or securities3 9 Although the regulations do not make this clear, it
would appear that stock issued to a contributor of services at a bargain
price would be considered to be issued in part for services and
therefore disqualified for section 1244 treatment.40 Also, the require-
ment of the regulations that the stock be issued "pursuant to a.. plan
. to offer only such stock during a period .. [of no more] than two
years,"41 could be construed to disqualify all of the stock if any shares
in the initial offering were issued for services. Until these questions can
be answered with certainty, it would be inadvisable for a small busi-
ness to risk loss of section 1244 benefits by issuing any common stock
directly for services or at a bargain to the contributor of services.
Even if it be assumed that the common stock of the Smith business
would qualify for section 1244 treatment, the use of a single class of
common stock upon incorporation of the business would still not be
feasible or desirable, though such a plan would maximize the avail-
ability of ordinary loss deductions to the organizers. The serious prob-
lems in allocating ownership interests among people with diverse
investment motives, and the dangers of compensation income to the
contributors of services should be of prme deterrent importance in
organzing the Smith business.
The Case for Use of Common Stock
and Debt
One straightforward but dangerous method for allocation of the
ownership interests in the proposed corporation to avoid the problems
of a single class of common stock would be to create solely debt and
common stock. Under the hypothetical facts Smith, Mary after Smith's
death, and Karen are to receive a senior claim on earnings and liquida-
tion proceeds in the new business. Richard and John are to receive
solely interests which will enjoy appreciation in the event of business
success, but not carry any senior claim to earnings or liquidation
proceeds. Smith is to retain control of the business.
It would appear that all of these investment motives could be
satisfied by allocating to Smith, Mary, and Karen senior debt securities
approximately equal in value, or face value, to the value of the old
business, and by allocating all of the common stock, which would have
nominal value equal at least to the ascertainable value of John's new
3 9 INr. BEv. CODE or 1954, § 1244(c)(1)(D).
4 o Cf. George S. Carter, 36 T.C. 128 (1961).
41 Treas. Beg. § 1.1244(c)-1(c)(1) (1960), as amended, T.D. 6637, 1963-1
Cum. BuLL. 139. (Emphasis added.)
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process, to Smith, Richard, and John. Smith could then retain a bare
majority of common stock, and Richard and John could share the bare
minority of common stock. In tins manner Richard and John could
have an interest in the business which would derive value from
future earnings, as well as enjoy a senior claim on the earnings of the
business through their right to salaries; Smith could retain control; and
Karen, Mary, and Smith could enjoy the desired senior claim on earn-
ings and liquidation proceeds provided by their ownership of the
corporation's debt.
An arrangement of ownership interests which employs substantial
debt and gives the common stock only nominal value would avoid
substantially all of the problems which flow from the use of common
stock alone. The peculiar advantage of creating common stock of only
nominal value is that any family member can easily be enabled to pay
full value for the business interest which will directly reflect apprecia-
tion in the value of the business. Although it would be difficult for any
participant to make a substantial loan or gift to Richard or John, if the
purchase price which they will have to pay is nominal, a small loan or
gift could be easily arranged. The prohibition against issuance of
stock for a promise of future services is no longer a problem if the
contributor of services can be provided funds for purchase of his
shares. Similarly, if each stockholder can be easily enabled to pay full
value in property for his stock, the danger that the incorporation-
transfer would fail of qualification under section 351 will be eliminated.
The disadvantage of the absence of senior securities in the one-class-
of-stock plan is cured by the availability of debt to be allocated to
those persons who desire a preferred claim on earnings or liquidation
proceeds.
The advantages of qualification of common stock for section 1244
treatment will be lost under this plan to the extent that the original
basis of the common stock is reduced. The ordinary loss treatment
available to the original stockholder for losses on section 1244 stock
is distinctly more beneficial than the capital loss treatment available in
the case of losses on non-business bad debts.4 It would be certain
under our facts, moreover, that none of the debt proposed to be
created upon incorporation of the Smith business would be treated
as business debts. 43 The advantage of using substantial common stock,
42 Upon becoming worthless, business bad debts yield ordinary loss deductions,
whereas non-business bad debts bring short term capital losses. INT. REv. CoDE oF
1954, § 166. Normally, a debt will bring capital loss treatment, long term or short,
depending on holding period if sold at a loss since the obligation will constitute a
capital asset under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1221.
43 See VWhpple v. Commissoner, 373 U.S. 193 (1963).
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and thereby maximizing the availability of section 1244 treatment
in the event of business failure, is outweighed by the advantage of
replacing common stock with debt because of the attendant dis-
advantages of using substantial common stock and the significant tax
advantages which would result from the use of debt in the event of
business success.
Upon the receipt of substantial earnings, and the attendant build-
up of earnings and profits, the ownership of debt of the corporation
would enable the creditors to withdraw property44 from the corpora-
tion as repayment of principal without danger of dividend treatment.45
If the creditors were also stockholders, a balancing of individual and
corporate taxable incomes could be achieved through choice and tim-
ing of dividend payments and repayments of debt. The payment of
interest on debts is taxable to the creditor,46 but unlike dividend pay-
ments, interest payments are deductible by the corporation 47 and
reduce earnings and profits.48
In short, the tax advantages of a substantial amount of stockholder
debt, or debt in the hands of non-stockholders such as Karen and Mary,
would be extremely significant and would probably provide more
potential for tax savings than use of a maximum amount of common
stock qualifying under section 1244.
Unfortunately for Smith, the Internal Revenue Service is fully
cognizant of the potential loss of revenue which is presented by the
use of debt in a small, closely held corporation. A plan so crude from
a tax standpoint as that proposed would introduce so many areas of
troublesome uncertainty for the Smith family that significant de-
parture from the proposed allocation of stock and debt would be
necessary.
Difficulties in Use of Substantial Debt
Uncertainty upon Incorporation
One of Smith's primary tax motives upon incorporation should be
nonrecognition of tax at the time of incorporation. The use of com-
mon stock alone was considered undesirable because it prejudiced
qualification under section 351. For different reasons an equally serious
44 If appremated property is used to satisfy such an obligation, a capital gain
would result.
45See generally Bmxa, FEmDAuL INcoME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
S an oLDmEs §§ 4.01-.08 (1959).
4 6 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a)(4).
47 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 163.
48See Brrnr, op. cit. supra note 45, § 5.05, at 148.
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threat to nonrecognition of gain in the incorporation is posed by use
of substantial debt.
If the transfer of the old business to the new corporation meets
the requirements for qualification under section 351, the transaction
will ordinarily be tax free49 to the extent that "stock or securities" in
the new corporation are created in the hands of the transferors. 0 The
transaction will still qualify under section 351 if property other than
stock or securities is given to the transferors, but a taxable gain would
be recognized to the extent of the value of such "other property."51
In the Smith business, recognition of gain upon incorporation
would probably entail the recognition of substantial ordinary income.
To the extent that the -transaction was taxable, and the property of the
old business was therefore considered sold to the corporation, the
transferors would realize ordinary income by reason of depreciation
recapture to the extent that depreciation for tax purposes on the per-
sonal property in the business since December 31, 1961, is reflected
in taxable gain.52 There would also be a tax at ordinary income rates
miposed by reason of depreciation recapture on the real property in
the business to the extent that depreciation taken on a faster than
straight line basis after December 31, 1963, is reflected in taxable
gain. 3 Inventory of the Smith business, to the extent a taxable ex-
change was determined, would likewise result in ordinary income.n
In addition, to the extent that non-capital assets of Smith's sole pro-
prietorship had a value in excess of their basis at the time of the incor-
poration, a recognition of gain on incorporation would result in a tax
at ordinary income rates if Smith, or Smith and Mary, received more
than eighty per cent in value of the stock of the new corporaton n5
Some commentators 'have raised the question whether, upon a tax-
able incorporation, the principals could allocate the basis of contrib-
uted assets by agreement. In other words, it would usually be advan-
tageous to allocate "other property" as having been exchanged for
49 See id. §§ 3.12-.13. If the reserve method of accounting for bad debt had been
employed by Smith m his mdividual business, a taxable gain would be recogmzed by
Smith to the extent of the balance m the reserve account at the time of incorporation.
Estate of Heinz Schrmdt, 42 CCH TAx CT. REP. Dec. 26987 (1964).
50 See generally Brr-KER, op. cit. supra note 45, §§ 3.01-.14.
5 1 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 351(b).
5 2 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1245.
53 INT. BRv. COD. OF 1954, § 1250.
5 4 Grace Bros., Inc., 10 T.C. 158 (1948), aff'd, 173 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1949).
55 INT. REv. CODE. OF 1954, § 1239. If the purported debt of the enterprise is
treated as stock for tax purposes then Smith would probably own more than 80%
in value of the new corporation's stock.
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depreciable property not subject to depreciation recapture, and allo-
cate "stock and securities" as having been exchanged for inventory,
property subject to depreciation recapture, and other property the sale
of which would give rise to ordinary income. It would appear that any
challenged attempt to make such an allocation would be unsuccessful,
and that recognition would be required in proportion to the fair
market value of the transferred assets."(
If the definition of "stock and securities" cannot be applied with
confidence to the debt and stock created upon incorporation of the
Smith business, Smith and his family will incur dangerous risk. The
risk will include not only assertion of a tax but also a tax at ordinary
income rates to the extent nonrecognition property is treated as hav-
ing been exchanged for depreciable assets or inventory.
The rules for determining what is a "security" within the meaning
of section 351, however, are by no means clear. The classification of
"stock" for purposes of section 351 would appear to be easy enough
by reference to basic corporate principles, but neither the code nor
the regulations provide any meaningful standard for distinguishing
between debt "securities" and "other property." The available au-
thority indicates that "the length of tune to maturity is regarded as the
most important single earmark."5 7 The longer the maturity of debt
created on incorporation, the more likely the instrument is to be con-
sidered a "security." Any debt instrument providing for maturity sooner
than five years from the date of issuance would ordinarily be treated
as "other property."5 8 Under what circumstances will instruments with
maturity longer than five years be considered as "securities"? The
answer is not clear, but any provision in the instrument which in-
dicates a more permanent participation of the creditor in the business,
such as provision for participation in management upon default, would
probably strengthen the argument for "security" classification.59 If
the length of the maturity date is expanded, particularly if it is in-
creased to more than ten years, 0 and if any additional provisions
indicate an intention on the part of the creditor to maintain his rela-
tionship for a significant length of time, "security" status can be as-
56 See Treas. Reg. § 1.358-2(a)(2) (1955).
57 BrrrKEP, op. cit. supra note 45, § 3.03, at 82; cf. Camp Wolters Enterprises,
Inc., 22 T.C. 737, 750-51 (1954).
5 Brmxn, op. cit. supra note 45, § 3.03.
59 Cf. Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462, 470 (1933);
John W Harrson, 24 T.C. 46 (1955).
0 Cf. Camp Wolters Enterpnses, Inc., 22 T.C. 737 (1954).
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sured.16 Unfortunately, there are equally compelling tax dangers which
would be exacerbated by the extension of maturity date of the "debt"
or by any provision that a purported creditor could share in manage-
ment in the event of default. Any such provisions would potentially
damage defense of the purported debt against Service attack on its
status.
If only "securities" are given to Karen, and if such securities carry
no voting rights, then it is arguable that Karen does not qualify as
a "transferor" entitled to nonrecognition treatment under section
351.62 This problem could be solved with relative ease by creating
nominal stock in Karen's hands, or by arranging for Smith to in-
corporate his business before giving any interest to Karen.
No plan for incorporation should be arranged for Smith unless it
can be predicted that no tax will arise from the incorporation transfer.
The compelling importance of predictability at this stage cannot be
overemphasized. If Smith and his family recognize a substantial tax
liability upon incorporation of their business, the funds used to satisfy
the tax obligation would probably be, in effect, withdrawn from the
working capital of the new business.
Uncertainty After Incorporation
Another area of potential uncertainty in connection with allocation
of debt and common stock would result from the vulnerability of the
purported debt to a Service attack of its status as debt for tax purposes.
The points which the Commissioner would raise would be the avail-
ability of interest deductions to the corporation, the availability of bad
debt deductions to the stockholder, and the proper recognition of pay-
ments made with respect to the purported debt.63 If predictable results
are not available in the event of Service attack on any of these points,
then most of the advantages claimed for the creation of debt upon
incorporation of the Smith business will be lost.
61 See generally Brrmm, op. cit. supra note 45, § 3.03, at 82.
62 Section 351, read literally, appears to require that each of the "transferors"
who is to qualify for nonrecognition treatment must actually share in the ability to
exercise control by receipt of a security entitling him to vote. If this be true, any person
who does not receive a voting security would have to treat the transfer of property
in exchange for his nonvoting interest as a taxable exchange under § 1002. Section
351 could reasonably be construed, however, to intend that the recipient of nonvoting
securities should be entitled to nonrecognition if he was associated with the persons
obtaining control in the transaction. Cf. Burr Oaks Corp., 43 CCH TAx CT. tia,.
Dec. 27240 (1965), in which the Tax Court holds that a recipient of a nonvoting
interest may be considered a tranferor for the purposes of the control test of § 351.
63 See Caplin, The Caloric Count of a Thin Incorporation, N.Y.U. 17TH INST. oN
Fan. TAx 771, 811 n.198 (1959).
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Perhaps no tax question of corporation-stockholder relations has
been as litigated as the question of the bona fides of stockholder debt.
A general discussion is beyond the scope of this article,6 but the tax
status of stockholder debt created upon incorporation of a small going
business is of concern here. The recent leading cases on this narrow
point reflect a tendency of the courts to emphasize subjective rather
than objective factors, and reveal several arguments of the Commis-
sioner which have a significant impact on this kind of stockholder debt.
In the recent cases the Service has argued that a showing that the
purported debt was created in consideration for a substantial part of
the operating assets of the business should carry the court a long way65
toward a finding that the debt was intended to be "permanent invest-
ment in the risk of the business rather than... [a] temporary loan."66
The Commissioner can usually muster other factors which will
provide inferential support for hIs argument that the purported creditor
must have, or must be presumed to have, intended to contribute the
purported debt as part of the permanent capital structure of the busi-
ness. Such factors may be: (a) the actual experience of the creditor in
failing to observe formalities or in extending the due date of install-
ments without formal n6gotiations;67 (b) the lack of investment
quality of the purported debt-usually sought to be established in part
by the basis of ratio of debt to equity, s as well as by a consideration
of the possibility of obtaining outside credit on similar terms;69 (c)
pro rata holding of stock and debt, which appears particularly sig-
nificant when post-incorporation advances of purported debt are main-
tained in studied proportion to stock holdings.70
The Commissioner may be expected to argue, in the absence of
other factors providing significant support for an attack on the pur-
ported debt, that in a going business new debt cannot be created
04 See generally Goldstein, Corporate Indebtedness to Shareholders: "ThIn Cap-
italization" and Related Problems, 16 TAx L. REv. 1 (1960); Caplin, supra note 63.
05 The exact evidentiary relationship between the questions of pure fact and the
ultimate findings is not clear.
06 Brake & Elec. Sales Corp. v. United States, 287 F.2d 426 n.1 (1st Cir. 1961)
(quoting the district court).
67 Ibid., cf. Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir.
1956).
6 8 The ratio of debt to equity is seldom cited in the more recent cases as a factor
of independent significance, and has been disregarded in some cases. See Rowan v.
United States, 219 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1955).
69See Benjamin D. Gilbert, 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 29 (1958), aff'd, 262 F.2d
512 (2d Cir. 1959). See generally Goldstein, supra note 64.70 Charter Wire, Inc. v. United States, 309 F.2d 878 (7th Cir. 1962); Gilbert v.
Commissioner, 262 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1959).
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either by a dividend on equity7l (in the case of a corporation) or
by mcorporaton 72 (in the case of an unincorporated business) without
the injection of new capital; in other words the operating assets the
purchase of which was originally financed by an equity investment
cannot be-refinanced internally so as to provide .the basis for stock-
holder debt.73 A position which would disallow the creation of stock-
holder debt in exchange for (or to finance the purchase of) operating
assets would, m effect, preclude creation of debt upon incorporation
of the typical small business. In fact, the relationship of the financing
of basic assets and the creation of debt has been rejected as a deter-
minative factor in itself, and treated as only one factor in reaching
the ultimate question of the intention, or presumed intention, of the
"creditor" toward his purported debt interest in the business.74
It is also important to note that the argument that stockholder
debt must be of sufficient investment quality to permit outside bor-
rowing would usually be fatal to the creation of debt in small business.
This factor has not been accepted as determinative by itself.75 The
general approach of the circuit courts toward stockholder debt, and
particularly debt created upon incorporation of a going business, has
been to approve the application of various factors to the determination
of the ultimate question of the "real" intention of the parties as to the
transaction.7" The test of "intention" here is not necessarily subjec-
tive.77
The present case law on this question is not conducive to certainty
71 Compare the following description of the Commissioner's position as described
in Kraft Foods Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 118, 126 (2d Cir. 1956)- "The Com-
missioner argues that since the debentures were neither issued for borrowed money
nor against accumulated earnings, they simply represented the ongmally-mvested
equity capital in a new dress. He asserts, in substance, that a closely held corporation
and its controlling stockholders are powerless to change any part of initial equity
capital into valid indebtedness by means of a dividend valid under state law." This
position was rejected m the Kraft Foods case.
72 See the court's comment on the government's position in Daytona Marine Sup-
ply Co. v. United States, 61-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9523, at 81221 (S.D. Fla. 1961). "The
Government in this case appears in reality to be contending for a new or novel rule of
law to the effect that no bona fide indebtedness for Federal tax purposes can be cre-
ated where the organizers of a new corporation cause operating assets to be transferred
to it as a part of its initial capitalization in return for the issuance of bonds and stock."
The court then rejected the government's position.
7a Ibid.
174 Ibid.
175See Benjamin D. Gilbert, 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 29 (1958), aff'd, 262 F.2d
512 (2d Cir. 1959), where one of several findings listed by the court was that "no
outside investor would have made similar advances without security." Id. at 30.
76Benjamin D. Gilbert, supra note 75.
77 Ibid.
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in planning the debt-stock structure of small corporations. The im-
portance of certainty in creation of stockholder debt is increased by
the virtually uiversal practice of the tax cases to hold either that the
purported debt is all debt or all equity 78 This all or nothing approach
is certainly anomalous in the sense that many of the factors applied
by the courts involve questions of degree-the ratio of debt to equity,
the extent to which basic operating assets have been financed by debt,
and the investment quality of the purported debt. In most of the
cases in which the Commissioner has been successful in attacking debt
instruments which appeared valid on their face, any significant reduc-
tion of the amount of debt relative to equity would appear to have
provided the taxpayer a better chance of victory Still, it would be
difficult for the Commissioner or a court to draw a precise line defining
a quantitative limit on the permissible debt. Such ]udicial definition
would be impractical if not improper," and there have been sug-
gestions that some specific quantitative standards should be provided
by statute. 0
The cases involving stockholder debt are of concern to the Smiths.
Under the proposal for creation of debt equal to ninety per cent
or more of the value of the old business. Smith and his family had
planned to allocate some portion of debt to Karen, who would own
no stock in the enterprise, and to allocate common stock to John
and Richard, who would own no debt of the enterprise. The debt
and stock would not be held proportionately, and not all of the debt
would be held by stockholders. Neither the lack of pro rata holding,
nor the presence of some non-stockholder debt would significantly
increase the strength of the purported debt against Service attack,
however. The absence of strict pro rata holding has not been con-
sidered a factor favorable to the taxpayer if one managing owner,
Smith in our case, holds the lion's share of stock and debt.81 Also, a
lack of pro rata holding resulting from allocation of equity to the
78 See Goldstein, supra note 64, at 10, 30. But cf. Gilbert v. Commissioner, 262
F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1959) (differentiating between instruments identical on their face
held by family and nonfamily members). No reported cases have been found which
allowed some but not all of the debt on a quantitative test.
79 "We know of no rule which permits the Commissioner to dictate what portion
of a corporation's operations shall be provided for by equity financing rather than by
debt." Miller's Estate v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 729, 734 (9th Cir. 1956).
80 See Hearings on Advisory Group Recommendations on Subchapters C, J, and K
of the Internal Revenue Code Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 925, 933 (ABA Section of Taxation, Legislative Recommendations in
Respect of the Provisions of Subchapter C).
81 Brake & Elec. Sales Corp. v. United States, 287 F.2d 426 (1st Cir. 1961); cf.
Ben P. Gale, 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 518 (1956).
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services-man (Richard) and debt to the money-man (Smith), has
been considered a neutral factor m determining the bona fides of pur-
ported debt. 2 Moreover, almost every other factor which has been
cited by the courts m the stockholder debt cases could be applied
to an Internal Revenue Service attack on the purported debt. The
Service could argue that substantially all of the operating assets of
the old business had been exchanged for debt in the new corpora-
tion. It would be obvious, then, that the purported creditors would
have to look to future earnings for repayment of their debt. Even in
the Ninth Circuit, which has generally rejected the factor of transfer
of operating assets for debt as a point of peculiar importance, the
preponderance of debt created upon transfer of the operating assets
of -the Smith proprietorship to a corporation would provide support
to the Service attack. 8 The debt to equity ratio in the Smith cor-
poration, assuming allocation of stock and debt in the manner tenta-
tively proposed above, would be very high. Moreover, it could not be
said that substantial equity had been invested in the business, and
it would be clear that an outside creditor would not loan to the Smith
business on terms similar to the debt held by the Smith family. The
investment quality of the debt, then, would be found to be very low.
Also, on the basis of authorities available in the Ninth Circuit con-
cerning subordination of stockholder debt to outside creditors on bank-
ruptcy, 4 it would appear that the Smith family debt would be
vulnerable on this ground too. This factor has importance both because
Smith and his family would be planning, presumably, for creation of
debt which would withstand attack by outside creditors, and because
the court in a tax case might consider vulnerability in the property
law context to be a significant factor in determining the bona fides
of the debt for tax purposes.
Finally, if debt were created approximately equal to the value of
the old business upon incorporation, it would be extremely unlikely
that installment payments could be made when due during the early
years of the new business unless the payments were described under
a2"It is true that the advances made by the taxpayer were not proportionate to
his stock holdings... But here the amounts paid in for capital stock were so small as
to be purely nominal and the taxpayer's contribution in cash was balanced by highly
skilled services contributed by other stockholders. In such a case, neither reason nor
authority requires that for purposes of federal tax law advances by a stockholder shall
constitute risk capital only if contributed in proportion to existing stock holdings."
Reed v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 334, 335 (2d Cir. 1957).8 3 Miller's Estate v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1956).
84 E.g., Costello v. Fazio, 256 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1958).
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a schedule which took into account the possibility of reduction of
earnings during years of development and marketing of John's process.
If extensions were made in the due date of installment debt, it would
be another argument against the purported debt; if the length of
maturity were extended in order to flatten the size of the periodic
payments, the duration of the obligation would strengthen the argu-
ment that the purported debt was intended as part of the permanent
capital structure.
The strength of this attack would be significantly weakened if
formalities customary among corporation creditors were observed in
connection with the extensions. In the Smith family business, however,
it would be unlikely that strict formalities could be observed if several
installments were missed. The incentive present to outside creditors
in preserving their claims would be diminished in the case of Smith
and other members of the family holding the purported debt.
In summation, upon incorporation of a going business such as the
Smith business, the danger of successful attack on stockholder debt
indicates that it would be inadvisable to create debt in the face amount
of the going concern value of the old business and to create common
stock of only nominal value. In fact, such an allocation would seem to
cause problems as great as those presented by the use of common stock
alone.
The Case for Use of Common Stock,
Preferred Stock and Debt
Can a combination of nominal common stock, preferred stock, and
debt be tailored to avoid the dangers of the plans above and still
properly reflect the various interests of -the Smith family in the
business?
Two vulnerable aspects of the debt used in -the previous example
were its value in relation to the actual value of the common stock and
its lack of class from an investment standpoint. It was also anticipated
that an attack could be made on its status because it was received
in exchange for essential operating assets of -the business. The size of
the debt complicated planning for making payments when due, unless
special payment plans providing for reduced installments in the
earlier years could be tailored, and it was anticipated that any exten-
sion of payments without proper formalities could strengthen argu-
ments against the debt.
If a substantial portion of the debt used in the previous proposal
was replaced by preferred stock, not only could the installment pay-
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ments more easily be made when due, but the impact of -the other
Internal Revenue Service arguments would be lessened.
For instance, Smith might replace half of the debt created in the
previous proposal with preferred stock. Under the prevailing regula-
tory climate of the California Division of Corporations, creation of
preferred stock in a newly incorporated business would necessitate
the imposition of an escrow condition as a prerequisite to the issuance
of shares.85 This condition will not be particularly onerous to the
ordinary family business, however, because members of the family
will usually resign themselves to relatively poor prospects of sale of
their stock to outsiders until the business has achieved a substantial
earned surplus. In the event of such substantial surplus, the escrow
condition could presumably be removed. As a prerequisite to removal
of the escrow condition, the Division of Corporations would require
that the preferred stock contract provide -the preferred stockholders
voting rights in the event of dividend failure. 6 Presumably, these pro-
visions would not be required if only the common stock was released
from escrow. If questions regarding future relocation of voting con-
trol upon a desired public sale of the stock are to be avoided, it
might be desirable for the preferred stockholders to be given majority
voting control in the first instance. In our case this would mean
awarding a majority of the preferred stock to Smith.
Smith could upon incorporation create debt, preferred stock, and
common stock in the following proportions relative to the value of the
old business: debt forty-eight per cent, preferred stock forty-eight per
cent, and common stock four per cent. Using these proportions, the
significant advantages flowing from creation of common stock of only
nominal value would be retained. Smith could still retain control of
the corporation through.ownership of a bare majority of the stock to
which voting control was awarded. Assuming two per cent of the
total value of the business to be a nominal amount in value, it would
be easy for John or Richard, by loan or gift from Smith or otherwise,
to obtain sufficient funds to purchase their common stock interests.
The proposed allocation of debt, common stock, and preferred
stock would strengthen the position of the purported debt against
attack by the Internal Revenue Service, though predicting results in
this regard has been complicated, as noted above, by the difficulty
of applying the factors used by the circuit courts. The debt to equity
ratio would no longer present a factor favorable to the Service, and
85 CAL. ADMwI. CoDE tit. 10, art. 7, § 364.
86 CAL. Aravmw. CoDE tit. 10, art. 7, § 367.
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the investment quality of the debt would have been increased so that
it would be doubtful whether the Service could argue that no outside
investor would loan on similar terms. With the size of the debt re-
duced to less than fifty per cent of the value of the old business, it
would probably be possible to tailor the debt so that the periodic
installments would be within the corporation's budget, even during
the early years of development and marketing of John's process. If
the payments were actually made, the argument that the obligations
were not treated by the principals as "debt" could be avoided. The
argument that debt was given in exchange for basic operating assets
and that repayment could be accomplished only out of future earn-
ings would still be available. The Service would no longer be able to
argue that the operating assets had been financed entirely by debt,
however, and this-factor by itself has not been accepted as deter-
mmative in recent cases,87 particularly in the Ninth Circuit.88
Some additional protection for the purported debt in the enter-
prise could be provided by withholding some basic asset of the cor-
poration and leasing it to the newly formed corporation. To the extent
that the value of the assets transferred was reduced by withholding
the asset, the debt created could be reduced. The leased asset would
be analogous to a senior debt security in the hands of the Smith
family, but there is no indication under present authorities that the
interest of the lessor could be treated as "equity" for tax purposes.8 9
Despite the similarity between stockholder debt and the stockholder's
interest as lessor in a real economic sense, a plan employing such a
leasehold interest would provide more assurance to the Smith family
that the debt would be recognized for tax purposes; the debt to
equity ratio would be lower and the debt payments would be easier,
although the investment quality of the remaining debt would prob-
ably not be increased. Under this plan Smith and Mary could retain
an interest in the corporation land, which for this purpose one might
assume to be equal in value to twenty-five per cent of the total value
of the going business, and the remaining seventy-five per cent of
business value could be allocated twenty-three per cent to debt, forty-
eight per cent to preferred stock and four per cent to common stock.
On planning control under this plan, it would probably be ad-
S7 E.g., Daytona Marine Supply Co. v. United States, 61-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9523
(S.D. Fla. 1961).
88 Miller's Estate v. Conmmssioner, 239 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1956); cf. Kraft Foods
Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1956). Compare Caplin, supra note 63,
at 792-93.
89 See generally Goldstem, supra note 64, at 28-31.
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visable to give voting control to the preferred stock and to have Smith
retain all of the preferred stock during his lifetime, allocating all of
the common stock to Richard and John. In the event of business
success, this allocation would diminish the possibilities of increase of
Smith's estate. Smith would still enjoy the benefit of business success
to some extent in the form of appreciation of his preferred stock,
however. By this plan, also, the problem of negotiating with the Divi-
sion of Corporations concerning the voting rights to be provided the
preferred stockholders on application for release of escrow could be
avoided. Smith could provide for Richard and John to enjoy control
of the corporation through ownership of more than half of the pre-
ferred stock after his death, either by bequest of the preferred stock or
by an appropriate buy-sell provision.
The reduction of the relative value of the debt in the corporation
would decrease the availability of an "escape hatch" for withdrawal
of corporate assets without dividend treatment. Withdrawal of assets
by redemption of stock ordinarily involves a dangerous risk of divi-
dend taxation. This is usually true of redemption of preferred stock
as well as of common stock. Redemption of preferred stock, when
preferred and common stock are not held pro rata, may more easily
be established to be substantially disproportionate for the purposes of
section 302 of the Internal Revenue Code than redemption of common
stock.9 1 The reduction of the amount of debt created upon incorpora-
tion may not be as serious a tax detriment, then, as it would have
been had the proposed debt been replaced by common stock.
On the other hand, to the extent preferred stock has been used in
the plan, beneficial tax attributes available with use of common stock
or debt have been lost. Preferred stock neither allows tax-free with-
drawal of property with certainty of non-dividend treatment upon
business success, as does debt, nor provides potential enjoyment of
ordinary loss deductions upon business failure, as does common stock
which qualifies for section 1244 treatment. Preferred stock has the
compensating advantage of acting as a ballast to maintain advantages
otherwise to be derived from common stock and debt, while at the
same time avoiding the cumbersome aspects of common stock alone
and the dangerous vulnerability of substantial debt which reflects a
substantial part of the value of the incorporated business.
On balance, the use of preferred stock, debt, and common stock
in the manner described, particularly when used with the suggested
go See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 302.
91Himmel v. Commissioner, 64-2 U.S. Tax Cas. f 9877 (2d Cir. 1964).
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lease arrangement of some business real property, appears to provide
a reasonable accommodation of the investment and tax planning re-
quirements of the Smith family. If the prospects of business success
alone are considered in planning for the Smith family business, the
use of the corporate form with this allocation offers a very desirable
organizational alternative. In contrast to the old Smith proprietorship,
or to any new unincorporated form, the corporation as a separate tax
paying entity will enjoy low rates on the first 25,000 dollars of earn-
ings92 and provide a mechanism for deflecting taxable income from
individual stockholders. Because there will be a variety of interests in
the corporation, a great deal of flexibility in the distribution of taxable
income from the corporation to the principals will be available. Al-
though the debt installments will probably be required to be paid
when due, flexibility will be available in paying dividends, and con-
siderable flexibility will be available in setting rent payments and
salaries. Through planning the various corporate distributions, a kind
of averaging of income for the family participants should be available.
Use of the corporate form is less attractive if the prospects of
initial operating losses or of ultimate business failure are considered.
In the Smith business the prospect of several years of substantial
marketing and development costs in connection with John's new
process may indicate a likelihood of low profits, or even losses, during
the early years. During any period of operating losses, running the
business as a corporation may be costly. Operating losses of a corporate
business cannot be passed through to the stockholders unless an effec-
tive election under subchapter S can be made and maintained. 3 In
the Smith case the use of a single class of stock, which is a prerequisite
to a qualification under subchapter S,94 is not practical; for that reason
alone a subehapter S corporation is often not a feasible alternative in
planning the organization of the small family business. It is important
to note, too, that an attempt to maintain a "single class of stock" for
subchapter S purposes by use of common stock and stockholder debt
is extremely dangerous; successful attack on the debt character of the
purported debt would cause retroactive disqualification under sub-
chapter S because the "debt" would be treated as a second class of
stock 5 Even if subchapter S status could be elected and maintained,
certain dangers would be present. Many small businesses achieving
92 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 11(b), (c).
93 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1374.
94INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1371(a) (4).
95 Catalina Homes, Inc., 42 CCH TAx CT. REP. Dec. 26937(M) (1964).
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subchapter S status have suffered from the impact of the subchapter
S rule that a stockholder's proportionate share of operating losses in
excess of his basis is not only disqualified for deduction to the stock-
holder,96 but also lost for all time as a deduction to the corporation.9'
This is not the rule in the case of a partnership; under partnership
rules, losses are limited as deductions to the basis of the partner, but a
loss in excess of basis in one year may be carried forward indefinitely
into future years.98 Absent subchapter S status, any losses incurred by
the Smith business in corporate form during the early years will
be deductible only by the corporation. Even during years of operating
loss for the business, Smith and Mary may be in a relatively high tax
bracket because of income from rentals paid on the real property
and from their non-business investments. Smith's and Mary's individual
tax brackets may well be higher during -these years than the corpora-
tion rates during any of the five years following the initial years of
operating loss, so that even if the losses may be carried over by the
corporation to future years, the disadvantage of loss of these deduc-
tions to Smith and Mary may be substantial. 9
Similarly, the use of common stock which qualifies for section
1244 treatment cannot provide -the same direct pass-through of oper-
ating losses which is available in a partnership. To the extent that com-
mon stock qualifies for section 1244 treatment ordinary loss deductions
would result to the original stockholders upon sale of their stock at
a loss, but initial losses by an ultimately successful business would not
be available for pass-through to the stockholders unless the stock was
sold by the original stockholders while a loss could still be recognized.
Such a sale would be unlikely in the case of a family business, and
even if such a sale did occur, an undesirable bunching of deductions
would result unless there were periodic sales. On the planned alloca-
tion of common stock in the Smith business, moreover, the loss
available for section 1244 purposes would be minimal because of the
low original basis of the common stock.
If it be assumed that the first years of operation of the Smith
business, years of substantial development and marketing costs, will
be unprofitable, then it will usually be desirable from a tax standpoint
to maintain a partnership rather than a corporation form for that
period.
9 6 INT. RFv. CODE OF 1954, § 1374(c)(2).
97INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 172(h).
981N'. RiE. CODE OF 1954, § 704(d); Treas. Beg. § 1.704-1(d)(1) (1956).
99 See h. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 172.
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Considerations on Formation of a Partnership
Except for gift taxes to the extent that Smith gives interests in- the
business to his children, the contribution of assets to the partnership
will not be a taxable event.100 John can contribute his patent at its
fair value without tax consequence. The parties have a reasonable
latitude in determining fair value unless it is clearly unrealistic. The
regulations provide that "normally, under local law, each partner is
to be repaid his contribution of money or other property to the partner-
ship (at the value placed upon such property by the partnership at
the time of the contribution) .. . ."01 The basis to the partnership,
as distinguished from the capital accounts of the partners, will be the
adjusted basis of the property to the member contributing it, deter-
mined at the date of contribution. 2 Smith can also lease the real
property to the partnership at fair rental value. A partner engaging
in a transaction with a partnership (except for certain sales and ex-
changes in the case of a "controlled partnership," which the Smith
Electric Company would be) can deal as if he were not a member of
it.10 3 Smith's lease of the real property to the partnership will have one
undesirable effect in that a donor's "retention of control of assets
essential to the business"104 is one of the elements considered in deter-
mining whether a donee is in reality the owner of a capital share.
Smith Electric Company will be a working partnership to which John
is contributing a valuable patent, so the retention of the real property
should not have adverse effect, though it is less desirable than a lease
to the corporate form. Smith's loans to the partnership do not run afoul
of the uncertainties that would be created in the corporate form.
Daughter Karen's interest can be established as that of a limited
partner; her share of profits should be in direct proportion to her share
of capital after allowance for managerial services because of the family
partnership rules, and her interest should also be qualified under the
provisions of Treasury Regulations section 1.704-1(e) (2) (ix) This
does not conflict with Smith's general planning, since if Karen's distrib-
utive share of profits is small during the early years there will be no
drain on partnership funds, and if the business becomes profitable,
even a small interest will provide her with substantial income. As a
limited partner she incurs no personal liability in the event of failure
100 INT. BEV. CODE OF 1954, § 721.
101Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (1956).
102 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 723.
103 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 707.
1O4 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (e) (ii) (c) (1956).
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of the venture and does not participate in the management; there is
thus no threat of disruptive interference by an absentee owner un-
familiar with the business.
The difficulties in allocation of income between Smith and his
sons under tax rules affecting family partnerships are perhaps the
principal problems encountered in the partnership form. Partnerships
between strangers have virtually unlimited power to allocate distribu-
tive shares of income without regard to the extent of capital contribu-
tions, and wide latitude is afforded such partners to adjust their shares
from time to time by partnership agreement.
In the case of the family partnership, subsection (e) (2) of Inter-
nal Revenue Code section 704 states that reasonable compensation
must be allowed for services of the donor and that the return on
donated capital must not be proportionately greater than the share
of the donor with respect to the donor's capital. Moreover, subsection
(e) (1) requires that the transferee must be the real owner-he must
have "dominion and control" over the interest -he has acquired.105 If
any substantial gifts of partnership interests are to be made to the
children, the tests set forth in the regulations as to the tax reality of
"dominion and control' of the children will limit the drafting of the
partnership agreement, including its buy-sell provisions. In this area,
reference has already been made to the fact that retention of control
of the real property is one of the elements the Internal Revenue
Service can consider in determining whether Smith should be treated
as remaining the substantial owner of the business. The draftsman of
the partnership agreement would therefore be particularly careful to
avoid restrictions on the rights of the children to dispose of their
interests at fair market value, powers in Smith to decide what shall
be retained in the business, or any other powers in him inconsistent
with the normal management participation of the sons, taking into
consideration their business functions and capital shares. To this
extent, the corporate stock buy-sell has greater latitude and, except
as restricted by the law governing duties of majority stockholders to
minority interests, the corporate form has more flexibility in this area.
Since Smith does not wish to make unnecessary taxable gifts at
the present time, since John is contributing a valuable asset (the
patent), and since the business will need funds for expansion, Smith
could loan money to Richard in an amount equal to the fair value of
John's contribution, taking Richard's note on terms that would apply
to an arm's length transaction. Since Richard's experience and selling
105 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(1)(iii) (1956).
[VOL. 16THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
May, 1965] FAMILY OWNED BUSINESS
ability is vital to the business, the transaction is reasonably related to
the success of the partnership and should qualify to meet the tests of
"reality of purchased interests" under Treasury Regulations section
1.704-1(e) (4) (ii) and thus help to take the case out of the restrictions
applying to gifts of partnership interests.
The test of the bona fides and business reality of the partnership
rather than form or extent or source of contribution to it was laid down
prior to the 1954 Internal Revenue Code by the leading case of Com-
missioner v. Culbertson,"'0 wherein it was said.
The question is not whether the services or capital contributed by
a partner are of sufficient importance to meet some objective standard
supposedly established by the Tower case [Commissioner v. Tower,
327 U.S. 280 (1946)], but whether, considering all the facts-the
agreement, the conduct of the parties in execution of its provisions,
their statements, the testimony of disinterested persons, the rela-
tionship of the parties, their respective abilities and capital contri-
butions, the actual control of income and the purposes for which it
is used, and any other facts throwing light on their true intent-the
parties in good faith and acting with a business purpose intended
to join together in the present conduct of the enterprise.107
An interesting provision of partnership tax law introduced by the
1954 Internal Revenue Code that may have relevancy to the Smith
partnership is the provision of section 707(c) allowing guaranteed
payments to a partner for services. Since John and Richard need a
minimum income for living expenses and presumably have no out-
side resources, it would be appropriate to provide salaries for them in
some reasonable amount. This also has the effect of reducing Smith's
taxable income and in loss years would benefit the family member
in the highest personal bracket. To the extent that "guaranteed pay-
ments" are made the effect is the same as salaries in a corporation.
The touchstone of determining "guaranteed payments" is whether
they are payable without regard to partnership income. And, in de-
termining whether in a particular case an amount paid by a part-
nership to a partner is a "drawing" or a "guaranteed payment," the
substance of the transaction, rather than the form, must govern. 08
The greatest advantage of the partnership form to Smith Electric
Company is the tax advantage with respect to likely losses during the
retooling -and research and development phase of the new operation.
Such losses, if sustained by a corporation, would not be available to
100337 U.S. 733 (1949).
107Id. at 742.
10SF A. Falconer, 40 T.C. 1011, 1015 (1963).
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the owners except through subehapter S or (upon sale of common
stock) through section 1244 treatment. If substantial preferred stock
were employed, subchapter S would not be available, and section 1244
would apply only to the common stock.
The partnership not only passes the losses to its members, but by
virtue of section 704(b) the partnership agreement may treat income
or loss emanating from different sources in a different manner so long
as the purpose is not the avoidance or evasion of tax. The Regulations
point out that consideration will be given to whether there is a busi-
ness purpose for the allocation, whether it has "substantial economic
effect," whether the allocation is consistently applied, and its duration
and.overall tax consequences." 9 One illustration in the Regulations
has particular relevancy to the Smith partnership:
G and H enter into a partnership agreement to develop and market
an electronic device. H, an electronics engineer, contributes $2,500
cash and agrees to devote his full-time services to the partnership.
G contributes $100,000 cash and agrees to obtain a loan for the
partnership of any additional capital needed. The partnership agree-
ment provides that the full amount of any research and experimental
expenditures and any interest on partnership loans are to be charged
to G. It also provides that U's distributive share is to be 90 per cent
of partnership income or loss computed without reduction by such
research and experimental expenditures and such interest, until all
loans have been repaid and G has received through his 90 percent
share of income an amount equal to the full amount of such research
and experimental expenditures, of such interest, and his share of any
partnership operating losses. During this time H's distributive share
will be 10 percent. Thereafter, G and H will share profits and losses
equally Since all of the research and experimental expenditures and
interest specially allocated to G are in fact borne by G, the alloca-
tion will be recognized in the absence of other circumstances show-
mg that its principal purpose was avoidance or evasion. 1 °
Properly and fairly applied, the partnership agreement could al-
locate the interest on business loans as well as the greater amount of
the research and development expenses to Smith's capital account and
give hun a large percentage of income or loss for a limited period. If
losses are realized, the effect will be to allocate the largest part of those
losses to Smith and to reduce his capital account by the amount of
interest and research and development expenses. Thus, when the
business becomes profitable, Smith has a loss carry-forward (if the
losses exceeded his other income), and the sons -have acquired a
1o9 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (1956).
i0iTreas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) Example (5) (1956).
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greater relative capital share in the business without the necessity
of gifts to them. Another item qualifying for special allocation in the
partnership agreement under section 704(a) would be the accounts
receivable transferred to the partnership by Smith. The income from
the transferred accounts receivable will constitute ordinary income
because they have a zero cost base and are transferred to the partner-
ship at the transferor's cost base. Thus while ordinarily Smith would
wish to have this item of ordinary income allocated among all the
partners, it may be possible that research and development expenses
and general operating losses will be so great that he would want to
have collections on these accounts receivable allocated to him. In the
case of a sale of an unincorporated business the contract frequently
excludes accounts receivable, but there is a strong business reason to
maintain continuity of relationship with the customers. This provi-
sion of the tax laws permits the partnership to enjoy the advantage of
their inclusion as assets for balance sheet purposes, assures a continuity
of relationship with the old customers, but allows Smith to enjoy the
proceeds realized upon their collection and thus allows recognition
of economic realities.
Section 704 has a second optional allocation provision that would
fit the Smith plan.
If the partnership agreement so provides, depreciation, depletion,
or gain or loss with respect to property contributed to the partner-
ship by a partner shall, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary
or his delegate, be shared among the partners so as to take account
of the variation between the basis of the property to the partnership
and its fair market value at the time of contribution.iii
Since machinery and equipment have been fully depreciated, any sale
of it could well result in a gain, and Smith might wish to have such
gains allocated to himself since he contributed these items to the
partnership. The agreement could so provide.
One caveat is in order. There is a limit on the distributive share
of partnership loss which Smith may deduct on his income tax return:
the loss may not reduce his adjusted basis below the amount thereof
as of the close of the tax year, but the excess of any such loss is not
dissipated, it is carried forward.i 2 Unlike other types of loss carry-
forward, it continues indefinitely, at least as long as the partnership
continues.
While it is true that all partners in Smith Electric Company will
313 lINT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 704(c)(2).
212 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(d) (1956).
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start with relatively low capital accounts (and Smith's may be heavily
reduced by the agreement allocating disproportionate loss items to
him), the cost base of Smith's interest in the partnership will be
increased by the necessary bank borrowing to obtain new working
capital." 8 Thus Smith's share of bank loans will have the same effect
on basis as a like contribution of money by him, and the amount
against which his share of losses can be applied will likewise increase
by his share of such indebtedness.
As pointed out above, paid-up stock may not be issued to Richard
(or John) for future services, but a capital account may be created
in a partnership in consideration of a contract to perform future
services.
114
Much is commonly said of the retirement benefits of working for
a corporation. While it is true that the profit-sharing and pension plans
afforded the corporation are attractive," there are some provisions
available to the Smith partnership also. If the business was incor-
porated, redemption of all or any part of Smith's stock upon retire-
ment or death at capital gains rates would present serious problems
under section 302 because of the attribution of ownership rules of
section 318. With the partnereship form, greater flexibility is afforded
on death or retirement, and the remaimng partners may obtain a
stepped-up basis. The partnership agreement could provide for a re-
tirement program under which a guaranteed payment could be made
to Smith for life"16 which would qualify as a partnership deduction
pursuant to section 707(c) and would constitute ordinary income to
him. In addition, his interest in the partnership can be liquidated in
a single payment or over a period of years at capital gains rates except
to the extent that the payments are made for unrealized receivables,
which portion the retiring partner must treat as ordinary income, and
except as to excess over basis of "substantially appreciated inventory
items."" 7 If the agreement so provides, a reasonable value can be
ascribed to good will."18 The retiring partner's interest in inventory
113 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 752. There is a dichotomy in the accounting sense
between the capital account of a partner and the basis of his interest in the partnership.
One instance of this is in connection with § 752 where a liability of the partnership
will increase the partner's basis but will not increase his capital account.
14 INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 721; Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1 (1956).
115 See INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, §§ 401-05.
116 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 736.
".l Items aggregating 10% of the fair market value of all partnership property
and having a fair market value in excess of 120% of their basis to the partnerslp are
"substantially appreciated." INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 751(d).
"18 Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1(b)(3) (1956).
[Vol. 16
FAMILY OWNED BUSINESS
is likewise converted to capital gains under this provision of the Code
except as to excess over partnership basis of "substantially appreciated
inventory items."
John and Richard can elect to adjust the bases of the remaining
property to reflect the gain paid Smith"9 and the payments made with
respect to unrealized receivables and substantially appreciated in-
ventory.120 These changes in bases have no counterpart in the cor-
porate entity when stock is redeemed and could be of great advantage
to John and Richard in reducing income realized on receivables and
inventory and creating new depreciation on depreciable property.
Conclusion
The facts assumed in the Smith case were formulated to avoid a
clearly indicated choice of business form. To this extent they are
typical of many small businesses whose owners are debating the ques-
tion of whether or not to incorporate.
Let us assume that Smith and -his wife Mary agree: (1) that
certain group insurance policies are community by reason of payment
of premiums from earnings, and that these policies are to be made
payable to Mary to assure her an adequate cash reserve; (2) that the
balance of Smith's non-business assets are his separate property; (3)
that the business real property has a value in excess of the community
share of the total business assets under either formula; and (4) that
whether Smith incorporates the business or creates a partnership the
real property is not to be a business asset but is to be leased to the
business by long term lease. Smith and Mary decide to create an
irrevocable inter vivos trust of the property to assure single manage-
ment, income to the spouses during their joint lives, and income to the
survivor of them. Upon death of the survivor the trust terminates and
the trustee is directed to sell the property, unless all remaindermen
direct distribution in kind, and to distribute the assets one half to
Smith's children and the other half to Mary's designated remain-
dermen.121
If Smith's personal assets are adequate to cover death taxes, he is
now in the clear to proceed with planning. If they are insufficient,
119 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 734.
120 INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, §§ 754-55.
12 1 Two observations are in order at this point: (1) Gift taxes may be incurred,
however the net effect (assuming no substantial pnor gifts) will result in savings in
death taxes; (2) Mary should have independent counsel.
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his plans must include provision for liquidation of a portion of his
business interests, or possibly more life insurance.
Had Mary been unwilling to cooperate, Smith might have found
that the corporate -form of business would afford less chance of dis-
ruption after 'his death, since under no circumstances would his owner-
ship represent less than the controlling interest in the corporation.
While he could not in that event lease the real property to the new
business form without Mary's joining in the lease, he could rent it to
the business on a month-to-month tenancy. And while he could not
give stock to 'his children, he could sell it at fair market value and loan
them the money to buy; the stock sold plus that over which he had
testamentary power would always represent substantial control of the
corporation.
Because of the strong possibility of a number of loss years resulting
from the expansion program of Smith Electric Company, a partner-
ship would seem to be the best choice of form for the early years. But
because the conditions underlying the decision as to form can change
from year to year, a constant review should be made to determine at
what point the corporate form may offer the most advantages. The
obvious change-over occurs when the aggregate of corporation and
individual income taxes is less for the corporate form than for the
partnership, but even there caution should be used because, for ex-
ample, there may be difficulties in redeeming Smith's stock because of
attribution rules.
Other factors will bear upon the testing procedure. As the business
grows and becomes more sophisticated the partnership will encounter
increasing difficulties in hiring and retaining highly qualified person-
nel, for it will be in competition with corporate employers having
profit-sharing and retirement plans on more advantageous terms and
qualified stock option plans for executive personnel which have no
counterpart in -the unincorporated business.
It would be presumptuous to attempt to discuss all of the factors
that should be considered in choosing the business form. What has
been attempted is to explore some of the advantages and disadvantages
that are not at all apparent to the owner of the business, to assist him
in avoiding undue emphasis on supposed advantage which is minimal
or nonexistent, to advise hun on a course of procedure that will in-
volve the least expense and greatest certainty, and to avoid a selection
that could prove costly if later conditions required a change of form.
In the introduction it was stated that any planning in this field
must be coordinated with Smith's estate planning. Only cursory refer-
[Vol. 16
May, 1965] FAMILY OWNED BUSINESS 549
ence has been made to this vital element, though the decision as to
treatment of certain items of property must of necessity be affected
by the nature of the property and Smith's plans for eventual disposition
of it. Whether Smith chooses the corporate form or the partnership,
it is clear that the sons will be the prime benefactors of business
success. Since their personal efforts will contribute to that success, it
is only proper that their rewards should be commensurate, but Smith
will undoubtedly wish to make other provisions for his daughter Karen
by annual gifts, inter vivos trust, will, or a combination of these
methods. The close coordination of estate planning with selection of
business form will be a continuing project.

